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Abstract
A model is constructed in which completely unbacked fiat money, issued by generic
supplier implementing realistically specified monetary policy designed to obey
certain sufficient conditions, is endogenously accepted by rational individuals at
uniquely determined price level. The model generalizes Lucas (1978) to an econ-
omy with frictions and specialization in production, without imposing the cash-in-
advance constraint. The uniqueness of equilibrium is the consequence of complete
characterization of both the environment, and the equilibrium concept. The re-
sults challenge the doctrine that equilibria of monetary economies are inherently
indeterminate, and that money can become worthless only due to self-fulfilling
expectations. The paper shows that monetary policy canonically features two
dimensions, one of which corresponds to nominal interest rate, and the other to
continuous helicopter drop of net worth, which in the model takes the form of
universal basic income.
Keywords: fiat money, monetary policy, Hahn problem, price level, inflation,
sunspots, helicopter drop, universal basic income.
JEL Classification Numbers: E10, E31, E41, E51, E52, E58, G12, G21.
∗Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin,
Dorotheenstr. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany.
1 Introduction
The main question addressed in this paper is whether there exist valuation prin-
ciples applicable to intrinsically useless tokens of completely unbacked fiat money,
if one does not want to rely on modeling shortcuts such as cash-in-advance con-
straints, or utility over real balances. The main result is that money is endoge-
nously accepted by fully rational agents, at uniquely determined positive value,
if the supplying institution obeys certain restrictions on the design of monetary
policy. The latter is specified in a realistic way, making the paper interesting to
readers wishing to understand policies of actual monetary authorities. The paper
highlights the role of nominal net worth, a variable under direct control of the
supplier of money, besides the nominal interest rate. By successfully integrating
the theory of money with the theory of value, the paper challenges alternative
explanations of the observed price level, and inflation.1
It appears useful to start with a list of properties of a successful theory integrating
money with asset pricing. As a theory of money, it should (1) clarify the economic
1The problem of integrating the theory of money with the theory of value (as-
set pricing) has been recognized by neoclassical economists (Walras, 1900; Hicks,
1935; Patinkin, 1965), dissatisfied with the practice of using the ad-hoc equation
of exchange (Fisher, 1911). However, a fully successful theory explaining how fiat
money is valued by rational individuals has apparently not been offered. For ex-
ample, Hahn (1965) observed that the theory of Patinkin (1965) did not rule out
equilibrium in which money is permanently worthless, and models with money-in-
utility, or equivalent, are generally known to allow for multiplicities of equilibria
under standard formulations of monetary policy (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983; Mat-
suyama, 1991), a property shared with overlapping-generations models (Samuel-
son, 1958), and other (so-called) micro-founded models. In a detailed review of
monetary literature, Hellwig (1993) concluded that the fundamental problem of
why fiat money is valuable at all, especially in the presence of securities that
dominate it as store of value (the Hahn problem) has never been solved. The well-
known recent controversies around the validity of the fiscal theory of the price level
(Kocherlakota and Phelan, 1999; Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2000; Buiter, 2002;
Niepelt, 2004), and the new-Keynesian model of inflation (Cochrane, 2011, 2018),
are interpreted by the present author as consequences of this unfortunate state of
affairs. Section 5.3 offers a more complete discussion.
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function of money in actual economies, offer a way to distinguish money from
other securities, and explain how the supply of money is determined. As a theory
of value, it should (2) explain why intrinsically useless tokens are accepted by
rational individuals, which factors determine their value, and how that value is
affected by monetary policy. Finally, it should (3) not contradict the evidence, and
not depend on implausible assumptions. The theory offered here satisfies these
postulates. It extends the asset-pricing framework of Lucas (1978) in apparently
novel direction, and does not rely on the cash-in-advance constraint. The main
source of progress lies in a more complete, relative to related studies, specification
of both (a) the environment, and (b) the equilibrium concept.
Regarding (a), the paper is explicit about all components of the environment,
including technological properties of the (pre-existing) payments infrastructure. In
addition, it is observed that there must exist physical limits on the dimensionality
and kind of available information. Specifically, all information is contained in a
finite-dimensional (possibly large) vector of recursively defined Markovian state
variables, which by itself does not rule out a broad class of sunspot processes that
might affect the value of money for non-fundamental reasons.2
Regarding (b), the definition of Lucas (1978) is generalized by adding a require-
ment interpreted as no-arbitrage condition, trivially satisfied in economies with
complete markets, and no frictions. Intuitively, a rational consumer should always
strictly prefer to accept a free, non-negative lottery known to possess a winning
state, even if the probability of winning is unknown, or cannot be defined ex ante.
If an equilibrium with valued money (in the original sense of Lucas, 1978) exists
as economically justified possibility, and yet money can be acquired for free, a ra-
tional consumer should be expected to strictly prefer to invest in more money at
2Specific assumptions imposing the informational limits are merely of technical
nature, and thus cannot affect the generality of qualitative conclusions.
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the margin. By allowing consumers to recognize all arbitrage opportunities, the
new definition of equilibrium is very well motivated economically. At the same
time, it naturally fits into the notion of competitive equilibrium, since consumers
are allowed to individually decide whether they should give up consumption in
exchange for intrinsically useless tokens.3
Competitive equilibria in the sense of Lucas (1978) are called pre-equilibria. Under
a reasonable monetary policy, defined precisely in the paper, there exists exactly
one pre-equilibrium with positive value of money, and a continuum of pre-equilibria
in which money is worthless. By the generalized definition of equilibrium, only the
former is economically interesting, and has the property that consumers strictly
prefer to start every period with more, rather than less, nominal net worth. For
any given level of net worth, individually formed expectations uniquely determine
the supply of money to the market for goods, which in turn determines the price
level that clears that market. The uniqueness is the consequence of saddle-path
dynamics characterizing accumulation of net worth. A too-high consumption must
ultimately violate the lower bound on net worth imposed by the supplier of money,
while a too-low consumption must lead to over-accumulation of net worth, which
is not optimal.4
The author does not think that a useful theory of money must be explicit about
deviations from the idealized complete-market Arrow-Debreu setup, which can be
a daunting task given the complexity of actual world. This work starts instead
3This idea requires a more general notion of arbitrage than formalized by Har-
rison and Kreps (1979), where probabilities must be assigned to outcomes. Sub-
section 5.1 offers additional discussion.
4This is analogous to the mechanics of capital accumulation in the Ramsey
model (for example, see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, ch. 2). The saddle-path
stability used to be imposed ad-hoc (Brock, 1974), but this practice has been
challenged (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983), and is now considered generally invalid in
the context of monetary models. The present paper argues that this conclusion is
in fact incorrect.
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from the observation that frictions exist, whether due to asymmetric information,
and/or opportunistic behavior. This is sufficient to highlight the economic function
of money as transferable, easily recognizable object existing in limited supply, and
study issues related to its adoption, and valuation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. Sec-
tion 3 defines equilibrium, and generalizes several results of Lucas (1978). Section
4 constructs equilibrium with positive value of money, and proves that there is no
other equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the equilibrium selection mechanism, and
relevant aspects of the literature. The conclusion is omitted.
2 Model
2.1 Preliminaries
The environment is simplified to avoid analytical traps associated with distribu-
tional issues. It features symmetric, infinitely-lived consumers, receiving exoge-
nous streams of perishable, stochastically growing endowment. Consumption of
goods produced by others is efficient, while consumption of own endowment results
in a proportional waste of κ ∈ (0, 1], which represents the degree of specialization
in production.5 Similarly, spot barter exchange, and privately negotiated forward
exchange, are subject to real inefficiencies.6 For convenience, it is assumed that
5The model abstracts from physical differences across goods while preserving
the motive for trade.
6Costs of barter can be interpreted as resulting from difficulties of coordinating
and executing simultaneous delivery of goods, especially if more than two parties
are involved, as must be the case under the absence of double coincidence of
wants (Jevons, 1875; Menger, 1892). The necessity of simultaneous delivery can
in turn be explained by the inability of consumers to enforce private promises,
which in the absence of quid pro quo delivery must expose the party accepting
a promise to ex-ante cost representable as expected discounted loss given default
of the counterparty. By the same logic, there must exist ex-ante costs to private
5
all these forms of exchange require proportional costs of at least κ to all involved
parties.
Consumers interact in a spot market where any measure of money can be easily
exchanged for goods.7 They are simultaneously buyers and sellers in this market,
and consider these activities independent. The market for goods is competitive in
the usual sense that agents are restricted in their ability to influence the aggregate
value of money (price level), of which they form expectations before trade, but
otherwise take as given. Money exists in the form of transferable tokens, where
transferability is defined as compatibility with a pre-existing payments infrastruc-
ture. For simplicity, the model ignores frictions in the flow of goods, which can be
consumed immediately after buying, but is explicit about frictions in the flow of
money, summarized by minimal technological time lag, referred to as Robertsonian
lag (Robertson, 1933), separating receipts from expenditures. This lag is fixed for
simplicity, and by convention only affects the timing of receipts from the market
for goods, while money raised by issuing securities is available immediately. For
convenience, the basic frequency at which the model operates is chosen to match
the Robertsonian lag.8
There is a generic monetary authority called supplier of money, with monopoly
on costless production of tokens that can be owned by consumers, and transferred
within the payments infrastructure. The supplier of money most naturally corre-
sponds to a consolidated, centrally coordinated banking system, issuing distinct
(also monetary) credit, which for this reason is not explicitly considered.
7This is consistent with individual incentives. Given the results of the paper,
agents must find it optimal to maintain a market in which money can be used
at minimal friction. Related points about the existence and organization of the
market for money have been made by Brunner and Meltzer (1971); Alchian (1977),
and more recently Howitt (2005).
8The lag could be made endogenous via a functional relation to real effort (shoe-
leather cost) exerted by the recipient of funds, and possibly other technological
inputs. The lag should however be bounded away from zero, also in a continuous-
time version of the model.
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but functionally equivalent monies within a single payments infrastructure, and
maintaining fixed exchange rates between them, or a central bank issuing single
type of money under the 100%-reserve requirement.9 The supplier of money is
canonically responsible for the design and implementation of monetary policy, but
its role extends to the maintenance of other components of monetary infrastruc-
ture. In particular, it assigns nominal net worth to every consumer, provides
costless accounting services, validates transfers processed through the payments
infrastructure, and intermediates a centralized market for risk-free loanable funds,
in which it sets the net supply. Consumers are not forced to use money, and can
ignore their accounts. There is only one supplier of money, and only one type of
token is technologically feasible.10
The design of monetary policy requires specifying two exogenous dimensions, in
equilibrium corresponding to nominal discount factor, and rate of new net worth
creation relative to nominal income. The corresponding dimensions of policy im-
plementation are algorithmic, and correspond to executing the transfers, and set-
ting the net supply of bonds in the market for loanable funds.11 The properties
of a reasonable monetary policy are imposed as two assumptions, requiring that
(1) the nominal interest rate is set sufficiently high in relation to the rate of new
net worth creation, and (2) the nominal rate remains sufficiently low relative to
κ, the inefficiency of consuming own endowment.
The model abstracts from the possibility of composite securities combining trans-
9The supplier of money is defined by its functions, and hence may differ from
an actual central bank, or government. After some modifications, it could be
interpreted as the Nature, computer, or cryptocurrency protocol.
10This can be interpreted as technological restriction, although actual suppliers
of money are usually able to legally restrict the use of tokens other than issued by
themselves. As a historical example, consider the Executive Order 6102 of 1933,
restricting the possession of gold.
11The bonds can also be interpreted as reverse-repo lending to the supplier of
money, or interest-bearing reserves unavailable for spending.
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ferability with a stream of dividends, so all contingent claims backed by dividends
are treated as non-transferable. This is methodologically correct, since it reflects
the separating line between two fundamentally distinct types of securities that can
exist in a monetary economy, and the two types could be used as spanning basis
for composite securities.12
Consumers have full knowledge of the environment, including the design of mon-
etary policy. They are experienced enough to formulate correct statistical models
relating variables potentially relevant to their well being to exogenous, from their
perspective, sources of uncertainty. This has been known as the assumption of
rational expectations, and is nothing more than deliberate focus on idealized mar-
ket outcomes in which expectations need not be (further) revised, rather than
behavioral postulate.
2.2 Timing and Information
Time is divided into periods represented by half-open intervals [t, t + 1). Con-
sumers, potential users of money, make decisions at t, after observing information
up to, and including that point. No new information arrives during (t, t + 1).
Aggregate variables are expressed per capita.
Assumption 1 All information is contained in state variables (Zt, et, ut, st) ∈
R+ ×R+ × U × S, where U = R
m−2, m ≥ 2, and S ⊂ Rn is compact.13 There is
a function F : S × S → [0, 1] such that st is a stationary, ergodic Markov process
with cumulative transition density F (s, s′) = Pr(st+1 ≤ s
′|st = s), and stationary
density Φ. There is also a jointly continuous (vector) function G : R+×R+×U×
12Extending the model in this direction, one could obtain a version of the
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, which is equivalent to linearity of equi-
librium valuation functional, also known as the law of one price.
13In what follows, R+ denotes the set of strictly positive real numbers.
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S → R+ ×R+ × U such that
(Zt+1, et+1, ut+1) = G(Zt, et, ut, st, st+1). (1)
This assumption restricts the dimensionality and kind of available aggregate in-
formation. The identity of the state variables will be explained later.14
The next technical assumption, preceded by definition, regulates the process st to
guarantee that expectations are continuous in the state variables.
Definition 1 Consider the space F of functions f : D → R, with D a Cartesian
product of k subsets of the real line, including one copy of R+, with corresponding
argument denoted by e. Fix ϕ(x1, . . . , e, . . . , xk) ∈ F as ϕ(e) = e
1−γ/(1 − γ),
γ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), or ϕ(e) = log e. For any function g ∈ F , define the norm
‖g‖ϕ = supx∈D |g(x1, . . . , e, . . . , xk)/ϕ(e)|. Any function g ∈ Z with the property
‖g‖ϕ < ∞ will be referred to as ϕ-bounded.
15
Assumption 2 For every ϕ-bounded and jointly continuous function f(x, e, s, s′)
(with x a vector of state variables defined on a Cartesian product of subsets of the
real line), the function (Tf)(x, e, s) ≡
∫
S
f(x, e, s, s′)dF (s, s′) is jointly continuous.
14Since consumers are symmetric, individual state variables are redundant, and
need not be included in the state vector. Still, competitive consumers will be
allowed to consider themselves distinct from the average consumer.
15Intuitively, a ϕ-bounded function does not grow (or fall) faster than ϕ(e), in
any direction of its domain. The definition and naming are standard (Altug and
Labadie, 2008, ch. 8).
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2.3 Consumers and Preferences
Consumers are symmetric, and live indefinitely. A representative consumer re-
ceives exogenous flow of perishable endowment et, following
et+1 = et λ(st, st+1), (2)
with λ : S × S → R+ continuous, and valued in a compact set containing 1.
According to (2), ut does not matter for the dynamics, which allows to interpret
it as vector state variable unrelated to fundamentals. Similarly, the dynamics
do not depend on Zt, later given the interpretation of nominal net worth. This
restriction reflects the fact that the unit of nominal measure cannot, by itself,
affect the dynamics of real variables.
Preferences at t are represented by
Vt = Et
{
∞
∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s)
}
(3)
where 0 < β < 1, u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ) if γ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), or u(c) = log(c).
The following assumption guarantees that the consumption-based value of the
economy is finite.
Assumption 3 The function λ(s, s′) satisfies w(s) ≡ β
∫
S
λ(s, s′)1−γdF (s, s′) <
1, all s ∈ S.
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2.4 Markets and Prices
The value of a unit measure of money is (1/P )t. Consumers take it as given, and
assume that they can trade freely at this price.16
Let Mt be the measure of money brought to the market by a consumer willing to
buy goods, which can be interpreted as endogenous supply of money. Similarly,
let Yt be the measure of money raised from the market by a consumer willing to
sell goods, which corresponds to demand for money. Both satisfy
Mt ≥ 0, Yt ≥ 0. (4)
The measure of money raised via Yt is limited by the endowment,
(1/P )tYt ≤ et. (5)
The clearing condition in the market for goods is
Mt = Yt, (6)
and will be referred to as Keynes law. While this condition must hold identically
(spending generates income), it must be imposed as equilibrium condition, since
consumers believe that they can choose Mt and Yt independently.
Consumption of own endowment yields ct = (1−κ)et. If Mt is spent in the market
for goods, consumption increases by (1/P )tMt. If a measure of money Yt is raised
by selling endowment, inefficient consumption falls by (1/P )tYt. Overall,
ct = (1/P )tMt + (1− κ)[et − (1/P )tYt]. (7)
16This definition allows (1/P )t = 0.
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The price of a unit risk-free bond is Qt, and the number of unit bonds held by a
consumer leaving the market for loanable funds is Bt. The clearing condition in
that market is discussed later (subsection 2.6).
2.5 Net Worth Accounting
At the end of t − 1, a representative consumer holds Wt units of money in the
form of end-of-period net worth, satisfying
Wt ≥ 0, (8)
which is enforced by the supplier of money (see below).
At the beginning of t, a representative consumer receives non-negative transfer of
new net worth Gt, available for use immediately.
17 Define beginning-of-period net
worth
Ht ≡ Wt +Gt, (9)
which under the assumptions so far satisfies
Ht ≥ 0. (10)
A consumer is allowed to choose Mt, Bt subject to
Ht ≥ Mt +BtQt, (11)
referred to as budget constraint.
Due to the Robertsonian lag, the receipt of income Yt occurs at the end of period.
17The case of Gt < 0, corresponding to negative transfers of net worth, is not
considered empirically interesting.
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Given Yt, the law of motion for end-of-period net worth is
Wt+1 = (Ht −Mt − BtQt) + Yt +Bt. (12)
Equivalently,
Ht+1 = Ht −Mt + Yt +Bt(1−Qt) +Gt+1. (13)
The non-negativity restriction (8) applied to (12) yields
Wt+1 = Ht −Mt + Yt +Bt(1−Qt) ≥ 0, (14)
which is perceived by consumers (who have decided to use money) as restriction
on choice.18
2.6 Design and Implementation of Monetary Policy
Let Zt > 0 denote aggregate end-of-period net worth per capita, defined recursively
via
Zt+1 = Zt +Gt +Bt (1− qt) , (15)
where qt is gross discount on risk-free bonds offered by the supplier of money.
With symmetric consumers, it must be true that
Wt = Zt, (16)
although these variables are considered distinct by individual consumers, who also
take the evolution of Zt as given, while controlling Wt.
18Inequality (14) implements the classic collateral constraint of Bagehot (1873).
To see this, write it as −Bt ≤ (Ht −Mt −BtQt) + Yt. On the left, −Bt represents
debt to the the supplier of money, end of the period. The terms on the right
represent good collateral, defined by the supplier of money as acceptable.
13
Observation 1 By (15), the value of Zt+1 is pre-determined at t.
The design of monetary policy is characterized by two stationary processes qt, gt,
adapted to the filtration generated by st. The supplier of money sets these pro-
cesses to qt = q(st), gt = g(st), for two continuous, bounded functions q : S → (0, 1]
and g : S → [0,∞), referred to as design functions. In equilibrium, the processes
qt and gt will correspond to nominal risk-free discount factor, and rate of new net
worth creation, respectively.
Two assumptions that follow characterize a reasonable monetary policy.
Assumption 4 The design functions satisfy 1−q(s)−g(s) ≥ 0, all s ∈ S. There
is S ′ ⊂ S with φ(S ′) > 1, and 1− q(s)− g(s) > 0, all s ∈ S ′.
Assumption 5 The function q(s) satisfies q(s) > 1− κ, all s ∈ S.
The former guarantees that the nominal discount is sufficiently low relative to the
rate at which new net worth is created, which allows for zero interest rate for
stochastically finite periods. The latter guarantees that the nominal discount is
sufficiently high relative to the degree of inefficiency associated with consuming
own endowment.19
Monetary policy is implemented as follows. First, given the policy design functions
q(s) and g(s) satisfying assumptions 4 and 5, one constructs a new function τ : S →
R. Let B be the set of bounded, continuous functions on S. For any f ∈ B,
define operator (Af)(s) = 1 − q(s) − g(s) + β
∫
S
λ(s, s′)1−γf(s′)dF (s, s′). Under
assumption 3, the operator A is a contraction mapping, so there is a unique
function τ ∈ B such thatAτ = τ (Banach fixed point theorem). Under assumption
4, the fixed point satisfies τ(s) > 0, all s ∈ S. Also, define the (strictly positive)
19The discount factor q is related to nominal interest rate via q = i/(1+ i). The
interpretation of these assumptions only makes sense in equilibrium.
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function h(s) ≡ τ(s) + g(s), which satisfies20
h(s) > 1− q(s). (17)
Second, given these functions, the supplier of money makes per-capita transfers
Gt =
g(st)
τ(st)
Zt, (18)
and offers net supply Bst of risk-free bonds, sold at discount qt, according to
bs(s) ≡
1
q(s)
h(s)− 1
τ(s)
, (19)
Bst = b
s(st)Zt. (20)
Before it can be established that money is actually valuable, it makes little sense
to require Bt = B
s
t as clearing condition in the market for loanable funds. Instead,
a weaker condition will be imposed. Define
[{x, 0}] ≡







[x, 0] if x ≤ 0,
[0, x] if x ≥ 0,
and restrict the demand for bonds realized by a representative consumer to
Bt ∈ [{B
s
t , 0}]. (21)
A consumer may refuse to buy the pre-capita net supply of bonds (e.g., Bt = 0 is
allowed), but can never buy more than is supplied, in terms of absolute value.
20 The strict positivity of h(s) follows from the definition of A, strict positivity
of τ(s), and the definition of q(s).
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Proposition 1 Under assumption 4, monetary policy implemented by (18) and
(20) has the property that Zt > 0 implies Zt+1 > 0.
Proof. To prove the claim for Bt = B
s
t , substitute (18) and (20) into (15), and
use the defining properties of function τ(s). The claim is true for Bt = 0, since
g(s) ≥ 0. Since (15) is linear in Bt, the claim is valid for all Bt ∈ [{B
s
t , 0}].
Letting Z0 > 0 be an initial aggregate net worth, proposition 1 provides a recursive
justification for Zt > 0, which would otherwise need to be imposed as sequence of
assumptions.
As a corollary of proposition 1, and (16), Zt > 0 is sufficient to guarantee that
end-of-period net worth of a representative consumer is strictly positive,
Wt+1 > 0. (22)
Intuitively, the net supply of risk-free bonds has been engineered such that repay-
ment of debt (if consumers are net borrowers) never exhausts the end-of-period
net worth. Since Gt+1 ≥ 0, this also implies
Ht+1 > 0. (23)
Still, consumers will be allowed to consider Ht = 0 as hypothetical possibility.
By (9), and (18), beginning-of-period net worth of a representative consumer sat-
isfies Ht = Zt[1 + g(st)/τ(st)]. Since g is bounded, and τ is bounded away from
zero, one can choose
h̄ > max
s∈S
(
1 +
g(s)
τ(s)
)
, (24)
and restrict Ht, for technical reasons, to the compact set
Ht ∈ [0, h̄Zt] ≡ H(Zt). (25)
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2.7 Expectations
Consumers form expectations of quantities relevant to their well-being, such as
prices, and aggregate state variables. Under assumption 1, these expectations can
be represented as functions of aggregate information.
Before entering the market for goods, but after observing information, a represen-
tative consumer forms expectations about the value of money using
(1/P )t =
et
Zt
η(Zt, et, ut, st), (26)
where η : R+ × R+ × U × S → [0,∞) is a jointly continuous function. This
is sufficiently general under assumption 1, and the ratio et/Zt has been added
without loss of generality.
Under this model, consumption (7) is
ct = et
{
(1− κ) + η(Zt, et, ut, st)
[
Mt
Zt
− (1− κ)
Yt
Zt
]}
. (27)
Similarly, the expectation of market value of risk-free bonds is formed as Qt =
Q(st), for a continuous function Q : S → (0, 1]. The functions η,Q are referred to
as price functions.
Transfers of net worth are known to arrive according to Gt = χ(st)Zt, where
χ(s) =
g(s)
τ(s)
. (28)
Finally, consumers believe that the aggregate state variable Zt follows
Zt+1 = θ(Zt, et, ut, st), (29)
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where θ : R+ ×R+ × U × S → R+ is a jointly continuous function. According to
observation 1, this function is independent of st+1.
2.8 Technical Restrictions
Additional restrictions are needed to insure that the choice set is always well
defined. These restrictions are by design compatible with the notion of competi-
tive equilibrium, by which consumers never directly experience aggregate supply
conditions, and believe to be able to freely trade in all active markets.
The demand for bonds is restricted to
Bt ∈ BZt ≡
[
−
¯
bZt, b̄Zt
]
, (30)
where B ≡ [−
¯
b, b̄], and
¯
b > 0, b̄ > 0 are chosen in a way that21
¯
b > −min
s∈S
bs(s), b̄ > max
s∈S
bs(s). (31)
By construction, the interval (21), defining the feasible range for the realized bond
demand is always strictly inside the interval (30).
Another constraint in addition to (5) is needed to restrict the demand for money
Yt at low values of (1/P )t, in order to prevent consumers from rising funds that
are not physically available.22 This problem can be stated in terms of Mt, since
if a given M̄ is not feasible as spending, then a representative consumer cannot
raise it from the market. By the budget constraint (11),
Mt ≤ Ht − BtQt,
21It is always possible to find constants
¯
b, b̄, since bs(s) is bounded.
22As an extreme example, a consumer might want to raise any measure of money
at (1/P )t = 0.
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and the right-hand side is maximized by setting Bt = −
¯
bZt, and Qt = 1. Since
the beginning-of-period net worth of a representative consumer is Ht = Zt[1 +
g(st)/τ(st)], one can choose ȳ > 0 such that
ȳ > max
s∈S
[
1 +
g(s)
τ(s)
+
¯
b
]
, (32)
and require that
Yt ≤ ȳZt. (33)
For future reference, (31) can be used to show that
ȳ > 1/τ(s). (34)
The pair of constraints (5), (33) can be written as a single constraint. Under (26),
both bind at the same time when η(Zt, et, ut, st) = 1/ȳ, so one can write
Yt ∈ [0, Ȳ (Zt, et, ut, st)], Ȳ (Zt, et, ut, st) ≡







1
η(Zt,et,ut,st)
Zt if η(Zt, et, ut, st) ≥ 1/ȳ,
ȳZt if η(Zt, et, ut, st) < 1/ȳ.
The upper bound Ȳ (Zt, et, ut, st) is strictly positive, and varies continuously with
the state variables, by the assumed joint continuity of η.
2.9 Consumer’s Problem
The variables relevant to a consumer are Ht, Zt, et, ut, st, and take values in X ≡
{(h, z, e, u, s) : z ∈ R+, h ∈ H(z), e ∈ R+, u ∈ U , s ∈ S}. The consumer evaluates
her well-being using a jointly continuous value function v : X → R.
Proposition 2 Any value function consistent with (3) is ϕ-bounded.
Proof. Let γ 6= 1 (the log case is similar). Define vt, the homothetic version of the
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utility functional, via (
∑
s≥0 β
s)v1−γt /(1− γ) ≡ Vt. For fixed et, let v̄t be attained
in a hypothetical economy without frictions, and
¯
vt = (1 − κ)v̄t in an economy
where the fraction κ of endowment is lost. Since vt in a monetary economy is
bounded between
¯
vt and v̄t, Vt is ϕ-bounded.
At the beginning of t, after observing Ht, Zt, et, ut, st, a representative consumer
forms expectations according to functions η,Q, θ, chooses Mt, Yt, Bt subject to (4),
(5), (11), (14), (30), (33), in order to maximize
u(ct) + βEt[v(Ht+1, Zt+1, et+1, ut+1, st+1)],
subject to laws (2), (13), and consumption function (27).
2.10 Transversality Condition
With rational consumers, the real value of Ht, measured at the market value of
money (1/P )t, cannot exceed the value of the whole economy. This observation
can be used to derive an upper bound on the price function η.
Choose w̄ such that maxs w(s) < w̄ < 1, and consider a consumer with CRRA
utility, and consumption stream {et+s(1 − κt+s)}s∈{0,1,2,... }, with κt+s ∈ [0, κ].
23
23Choosing w̄ with the given property is always possible under assumption 3.
The considered consumption process is sufficiently general to cover all possible
equilibrium consumption paths in the studied economy.
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The utility-based value of this stream satisfies
Wt ≡ et(1− κt) + βEt
{
u′[et+1(1− κt+1)]
u′[et(1− κt)]
et+1(1− κt+1)
}
+ β2Et
{
u′[et+2(1− κt+2)]
u′[et(1− κt)]
et+2(1− κt+2)
}
+ . . .
≤ et + βEt
{
u′[et+1(1− κ)]
u′[et]
et+1
}
+ β2Et
{
u′[et+2(1− κ)]
u′[et]
et+2
}
+ . . .
= et + βEt
{
u′[et+1]
u′[et]
et+1(1− κ)
−γ
}
+ β2Et
{
u′[et+2]
u′[et]
et+2(1− κ)
−γ
}
+ . . .
< et(1− κ)
−γ
[
1 + βEt
{
u′[et+1]
u′[et]
et+1
et
}
+ β2Et
{
u′[et+2]
u′[et]
et+1
et
}
+ . . .
]
< et(1− κ)
−γ
[
1 + w̄ + w̄2 + . . .
]
= et[(1− κ)
γ(1− w̄)]−1 ≡ etη̄,
where the second line uses the monotonicity of marginal utility, and the fourth
line follows from assumption 3, and the definition of w̄. The sequence of inequali-
ties shows that consumption-based wealth of a representative consumer can never
attain the computed bound.
A representative consumer holds Ht = Zt[1 + g(st)/τ(st)] ≥ Zt of beginning-of-
period net worth, so if η(Zt, et, ut, st) > η̄, then under the model (26),
Ht(1/P )t ≥ Zt(1/P )t = etη(Zt, et, ut, st) > etη̄.
Since rational consumers attempt to increase consumption at the margin at this
(or larger) value of Ht, equilibrium price functions η must be bounded.
3 Definition of Equilibrium
Informally, an equilibrium is (i) a function representing subjective valuation of the
environment by a representative consumer, and (ii) a set of functions representing
expectations of market prices, and evolution of relevant state variables. These
functions are requited to jointly satisfy the requirements that consumers exploit all
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opportunities to maximize utility, markets clear, and expectations are consistent
with actual evolution of uncertainty.
Before defining equilibrium, let C(h, z, e, u, s) ⊂ R3 be the set of triples m, y, b:
0 ≤ m, 0 ≤ y, (35)
b ∈ [−
¯
bz, b̄z], (36)
h ≥ m+ bQ(s), (37)
0 ≤ h−m+ y + b[1−Q(s)], (38)
y ≤
1
η(z, e, u, s)
z, (39)
y ≤ ȳz. (40)
where the last two inequalities can be combined into
y ≤ ȳ(z, e, u, s) ≡







z
η(z,e,u,s)
if η(z, e, u, s) ≥ 1/ȳ,
ȳz if η(z, e, u, s) < 1/ȳ.
(41)
For each Ht, Zt, et, ut, st ∈ X , the set of feasible choices Mt, Yt, Bt ∈
C(Ht, Zt, et, ut, st) is non-empty, since it contains the point Mt = Yt = Bt = 0, and
compact. The correspondence X → C is continuous.
Definition 2 An equilibrium is:
(a) A jointly continuous, bounded function η : R+ × R+ × U × S → [0,∞),
a continuous function Q : S → [0, 1], and a jointly continuous function
θ : R+ ×R+ × U × S → (0,∞),
(b) A jointly continuous, ϕ-bounded function v : X → R,
such that:
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(i) Given the functions η, Q, θ, the function v solves
v(h, z, e, u, s) = max
(m,y,b)
{
u(c) + β
∫
S
v(h′, z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′)
}
, (42)
subject to: c = e
[
(1− κ) + η(z, e, u, s)
(m
z
− (1− κ)
y
z
)]
, (43)
(m, y, b) ∈ C(h, z, e, u, s), (44)
h′ = h−m+ y + b(1−Q(s)) + χ(s′)z′, (45)
z′ = θ(z, e, u, s), (46)
e′ = eλ(s, s′), (47)
(ii) For each z, e, u, s, the value v (z(1 + χ(s)), z, e, u, s) is attained by m, y, b that
satisfy m = y, b ∈ [{bs(s)z, 0}], w ≡ z(1 + χ(s))−m+ y + b(1−Q(s)) > 0,
y < ȳz.
(iii) For each z, e, u, s, if there are functions ηp, Qp, θp specified as in (a), for
which a function vp specified as in (b) satisfies (i)-(ii), and if ηp(z, e, u, s) >
0, then η(z, e, u, s) > 0.
Condition (i) restricts the set of equilibrium value functions to those that are
consistent with maximized utility functional (3). The first two sub-conditions of
(ii) guarantee that individually optimal choices are consistent with market clearing
in the markets for goods, and nominal risk-free loanable funds, respectively. The
third sub-condition of (ii) guarantees that optimal choices are consistent with the
strict positivity of end-of-period net worth, as required by condition (22), and the
fourth sub-condition prevents the optimal demand for money from attaining the
technical upper bound of inequality (33).
Condition (iii) postulates that if money could be valuable without violating indi-
vidual optimality and market clearing, then the only market outcome consistent
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with equilibrium is when money is actually valuable. This equilibrium selection
mechanism can be motivated economically, as discussed in the introduction, and
further in subsection 5.1. Conditions (i)-(ii) are sufficient to define equilibrium in
the economy of Lucas (1978), where money must be worthless, in which case a
condition analogous to (iii) would be satisfied trivially.
Sets of functions η,Q, θ, v satisfying (a)-(b), and (i)-(ii), will be referred to as
pre-equilibria. Any equilibrium is a pre-equilibrium. If all pre-equilibria feature
η(z, e, u, s) = 0, then all of them are equilibria, since (iii) is satisfied. If there
is at least one pre-equilibrium with ηp(z, e, u, s) > 0, then the set of equilibria is
restricted to pre-equilibria with η(z, e, u, s) > 0.
Observation 2 Independently of monetary policy, there is a continuum of pre-
equilibria with η(z, e, u, s) = 0 for all z, e, u, s.
The existence of these pre-equilibria is allowed by the possibility of self-fulfilling
(rational) expectations that money is worthless. In such case, any value of Q(st)
technically clears the market for loanable funds in real terms, although the realized
demand for bonds may fall short of the supplied quantity.
On the other hand, the law of one price must hold in a pre-equilibrium with strictly
positive value of money, which guarantees that:
Proposition 3 If η(z, e, u, s) > 0 for all z, e, u, s, then Q(s) = q(s) in a pre-
equilibrium.
The rest of this section is concerned with other properties of pre-equilibria, i.e.,
the properties of equilibria that can be deduced from (i)-(ii) alone. The proofs
generalize those in Lucas (1978), with necessary modifications to take into account
more complex environment, and endowment growth.
Proposition 4 For any functions η,Q, θ specified as in (a), there is exactly one
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non-negative, jointly continuous, and ϕ-bounded function v satisfying (i)-(ii).
Proof. Let V be the Banach space of jointly continuous, ϕ-bounded functions
g : X → R. Let T be an operator on V, defined such that condition (i) of definition
2 is equivalent to T v = v.
Applying T involves maximization of a jointly continuous function on a compact
set, by assumption 2, and by the definition of C. Hence, the maximum exists.
Since the set C is given by a continuous correspondence in the state variables, the
maximum is jointly continuous in h, z, e, u, s (Berge, 1963).
The function (T v)(h, z, e, u, s) is ϕ-bounded, since the maximand in (42) is a sum
of two ϕ-bounded functions. Indeed, this is true of u(c) under the assumed CRRA
utility, since
c ≤ (1− κ)e+ (1/P )m = e [(1− κ) + η(z, e, u, s)m/z]
≤ e [(1− κ) + η(z, e, u, s) (h/z − b/zQ(s))] ≤ e
[
(1− κ) + η̄
(
h̄+
¯
b
)]
,
while the other part of the maximand satisfies
∣
∣
∣
∣
β
∫
S
v(h′, z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′)
ϕ(e)
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
β
∫
S
ϕ(e′)
ϕ(e)
v(h′, z′, e′, u′, s′)
ϕ(e′)
dF (s, s′)
∣
∣
∣
∣
≤ β
∫
S
λ(s, s′)1−γ
∣
∣
∣
∣
v(h′, z′, e′, u′, s′)
ϕ(e′)
∣
∣
∣
∣
dF (s, s′) ≤ v̄β
∫
S
λ(s, s′)1−γdF (s, s′) < v̄,
where v̄ ≡ supX
∣
∣
∣
v(h′,z′,e′,u′,s′)
ϕ(e′)
∣
∣
∣
< ∞, and the last inequality follows from assump-
tion 3. Hence, the operator T maps V into itself.
A similar argument can be used to show that for any a > 0 and f ∈ V, there exists
δ ∈ (0, 1) such that T (f + aϕ) ≤ T f + δaϕ. (Set δ = w̄, defined in section 2.10.)
In addition, (i) f ≥ g implies T f ≥ T g for any f, g ∈ V, and (ii) T 0 ∈ V. Under
these conditions, T has a unique fixed point v = T v in V, and limn→∞ T
nf = v for
every f ∈ V, by the weighted contraction mapping theorem (Boud, 1990). Since
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v ≥ 0 implies T v ≥ 0, the fixed point is non-negative.
Proposition 5 In a pre-equilibrium, v(h, z, e, u, s) is non-decreasing in h, and
concave in h.
Proof. To show that v is non-decreasing, consider (T f)(h, z, e, u, s), for any
f ∈ V. The maximum is attained by some m, y, b ∈ C. An increase in h expands
the set C, so Tf is non-decreasing in h. This is true in particular for T v, and then
for v, since v = T v.
Take any concave function g(h, z, e, u, s) ∈ V. Fix z, e, u, s, let h0, h1 ∈ H(z) be
chosen, and let mi, yi, bi attain (T g)(hi, z, e, u, s), i ∈ {0, 1}. Define ci = e[(1 −
κ)+η(z, e, u, s)(mi/z−(1−κ)yi/z)], and h′i = hi−mi+yi+bi(1−Q(s))+χ(s′)z′,
i ∈ {0, 1}. For 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, define hθ ≡ θh0 + (1 − θ)h1, (mθ, yθ, bθ) ≡ (θm0 +
(1 − θ)m1, . . . , . . . ), cθ ≡ θc0 + (1 − θ)c1, and h′θ ≡ θh′0 + (1 − θ)h′1. Note that
mθ, yθ, bθ are feasible at hθ, h′θ = hθ −mθ + yθ + bθ(1−Q(s)) + χ(s′)z′, and that
h′θ ∈ H(z). At hθ, T g satisfies
(T g)(hθ, z, e, u, s) ≥ u(cθ) + β
∫
S
g(h′
θ
, z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′)
≥ θ(T g)(h0, z, e, u, s) + (1− θ)(T g)(h1, z, e, u, s).
Hence, (T g)(h, z, e, u, s) is concave in h for every g ∈ V. Since functions that
are concave in h form a Banach vector subspace of V, the fixed point v = T v is
concave in h.
The established concavity can be used to prove that:
Proposition 6 Under (i)-(ii), if the value function v is attained by m in the
interior of the feasible set at some h, z, e, u, s ∈ X for which η(z, e, u, s) > 0, then
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v is differentiable in h, and
∂
∂h
v(h, z, e, u, s) = u′(c)
e
z
η(z, e, u, s) (48)
Proof. Fix z, e, u, s, and let f : R+ → R+ be defined by f(A) ≡ (T v)(A, z, e, u, s).
Let m(A), y(A), and b(A) attain f(A).
Define ũ(m) = u
(
e
z
[ηm+ (1− κ)(1− ηy]
)
. With η(z, e, u, s) > 0, ũ (m) is strictly
concave in m. By proposition 5, β
∫
S
v(h′, z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′) is concave in h′, and
hence inm, by (45). Therefore, the maximand in the definition of (T v)(A, z, e, u, s)
is strictly concave in m, so m(A) is unique, and varies continuously with A (Berge,
1963).
Let h′(A) = A−m(A) + y(A) + b(A)(1−Q(s)) + χ(s′)z′. For sufficiently small ǫ,
m(A)+ǫ is feasible at A+ǫ, and m(A+ǫ)−ǫ is feasible at A. Using the definition
of f ,
f(A+ ǫ) ≥ ũ(m(A+ ǫ)) + β
∫
S
g(h′(A), z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′),
= ũ(m(A+ ǫ))− ũ(m(A)) + f(A). (49)
f(A) ≥ ũ(m(A+ ǫ)− ǫ) + β
∫
S
g(h′(A+ ǫ), z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′),
= ũ(m(A+ ǫ)− ǫ)− ũ(m(A+ ǫ)) + f(A+ ǫ). (50)
Combining (49) and (50),
ũ(m(A+ ǫ))− ũ(m(A)) ≤ f(A+ ǫ)− f(A) ≤ ũ(m(A+ ǫ))− ũ(m(A+ ǫ)− ǫ).
Dividing by ǫ, taking the limit ǫ → 0, using the continuity of m(A), and the
definition of ũ(m), one has that f ′(A) = u′(c) e
z
η(z, e, u, s). The partial derivative
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of v(h, z, e, u, s) with respect to h is given by f ′(h), because v = T v, which proves
(48).
4 Constructing the Unique Equilibrium
This section shows by construction that under assumptions 4 and 5 there is only
one equilibrium of the model. In that equilibrium, the value of money remains
strictly positive.
4.1 Differentiability of the Value Function
The strict positivity of η is first imposed as hypothesis, in addition to conditions
(i)-(ii) of definition 2. Under this combination of assumptions, the pre-equilibrium
value function of a representative consumer must be differentiable in h, which is
established by the three propositions that follow.
Proposition 7 In a pre-equilibrium with η(z, e, u, s) > 0, the supply of money
represented by m satisfies m > 0 for all z, e, u, s.
Proof. A representative consumer holds h = (1 + χ(s))z = (h(s)/τ(s))z in
beginning-of-period net worth. By (45), h−m+y+b[1−Q(s)] strictly improves the
maximand of (42). Suppose m = 0, which also necessitates y = 0 in equilibrium,
by condition (ii) of definition 2.
If Q(s) < 1, a consumer would like to optimally set the demand for bonds b to the
maximal level allowed by the budget constraint (11), in order to benefit from the
positive interest rate, i.e., b = 1
q(s)
h(s)
τ(s)
z ≡ bd(s), where Q(s) = q(s) has been used.
This can only be consistent with condition (ii) of pre-equilibrium if the supply for
bonds bs(s), under the assumed monetary policy, is sufficiently large. However, as
28
seen from (19), it is instead true that bd(s) > bs(s).
If Q(s) = 1, the consumer does not have a strict preference between saving in
bonds or in money, since both result in the same value h of the resulting end-of-
period net worth. Consider a strategy of increasing m and y by a small number
ǫ > 0, which is feasible since h > 0, and because ȳ(z, e, u, s) > 0, as seen from
(41). This strategy leaves the end-of-period net worth unchanged, but increases
consumption by κ e
z
η(z, e, u, s)ǫ > 0, as seen from (43), and hence increases utility.
It follows that m = 0 cannot be optimal.
Proposition 8 In a pre-equilibrium, a representative consumer chooses m strictly
below the upper bound allowed by the set of feasible choices C(h, z, e, u, s), for all
z, e, u, s.
Proof. Define a ≡ h−m−bQ(s), and w ≡ h−m+y+b[1−Q(s)], which are non-
negative by (37), and (38). Since w is defined as in requirement (ii) of definition
2, it must satisfy w > 0 in a pre-equilibrium. Combining the two definitions,
m = h + Q(s)y − [1 − Q(s)]a − Q(s)w. Since Q(s) = q(s) > 0, maximizing m
requires setting w = 0, for any given values of y and a, which contradicts w > 0.
Hence, the choice of m by a representative consumer can never attain the upper
bound permitted by budget feasibility.
Proposition 9 In a pre-equilibrium with η(z, e, u, s) > 0, the value function v is
differentiable in h, at h = (1+χ(s))z, for all z, e, u, s.
Proof. By propositions (7) and (8), the value function v of a representative
consumer (for whom h = [1+χ(s)]z, by definition) is attained by m in the interior
of the feasible set. For each z, e, u, s, since η(z, e, u, s) > 0, the conditions of
proposition (6) are satisfied at [1+χ(s)]z, z, e, u, s, and hence the value function
is differentiable in h at h = [1+χ(s)]z.
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By equation (48) of proposition 6, the partial derivative is
ν ≡
∂
∂h
v(h, z, e, u, s)|h=[1+χ(s)]z = u
′(c)
e
z
η(z, e, u, s) ≡ u′(c)(1/P ), (51)
where c is optimal consumption of a representative consumer. In what follows,
ν ′ will denote the partial derivative evaluated at next period’s realizations of the
state variables.
4.2 Pre-equilibrium with Positive Value of Money
The established differentiability of the value function can be used to explore the
implications of η(z, e, u, s) > 0 in a pre-equilibrium. The problem (42) can be
studied using the Lagrangian
L ≡ u (e [(1− κ) + η(z, e, u, s) (m/z − (1− κ)y/z)])
+ β
∫
S
v ((h−m+ y + b[1−Q(s)] + χ(s′)z′, z′, e′, u′, s′) dF (s, s′)
+ µ[h−m− bQ(s)] + φ(ȳ − y),
(52)
where µ and φ are non-negative multipliers, and h = [1+χ(s)]z. The first-order
necessary conditions associated with m are
ν − β
∫
S
ν ′dF (s, s′)− µ = 0 (53)
h−m− bQ(s) ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, µ[h−m− bQ(s)] = 0, (54)
The first-order necessary conditions associated with optimal choice of y are
(1− κ)ν − β
∫
S
ν ′dF (s, s′) + φ = 0 (55)
ȳ − y ≥ 0, φ ≥ 0, φ(ȳ − y) = 0, (56)
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and the first-order necessary condition for the choice of b is
µ− β
∫
S
ν ′dF (s, s′)
1−Q(s)
Q(s)
= 0. (57)
Combining (53) and (57),
β
∫
S
ν ′
ν
dF (s, s′) = Q(s), (58)
according to which the consumer invests in bonds such that the expected dis-
counted nominal marginal rate of intertemporal substitution equals the nominal
market discount factor.24
Using (58) in (57), one finds that µ/ν = 1 − Q(s). Then, the complementary
slackness condition of (54) can be written as
[1−Q(s)][h−m− bQ(s)] = 0. (59)
Intuitively, consumers do not save money ’under the bed’ at a positive market
interest rate.
Dividing (55) by ν, and using (58), results in φ/ν = κ+Q(s)−1, which is positive
under assumption 5 on monetary policy. Hence, the complementary slackness
condition of (56) implies
y = ȳ(z, e, u, s). (60)
Intuitively, under a monetary policy that guarantees sufficiently low interest rates
in relation to the degree of inefficiency characterizing consumption of own endow-
ment, consumers always prefer to sell all endowment in the market, in order to
spend the proceeds later.
24While this condition is standard, it only holds as consequence of assumptions
4 and 5. The same comment applies to other equilibrium conditions.
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Condition (60) is not sufficient to determine which of the two constraints under-
lying the joint constraint (41) actually binds. If (39) does not bind, then it must
be true that y = ȳz, by (40). This is inconsistent with condition (ii) of definition
2, since it would mean that the demand for money y attains the technical upper
bound, which is not feasible, as described in subsection 2.8. Intuitively, the value
of money in a competitive equilibrium must be sufficiently high to allow consumers
to sell all endowment brought to the market for goods.
This result can be used to discard all price functions that do not satisfy
η(z, e, u, s) ≥ 1/ȳ, and interpret (60) as y = z/η(z, e, u, s), which is the same
as y(1/P ) = e. Since all endowment is sold at the market price, no endowment is
consumed inefficiently, implying c = e. Hence,
ν = u′(e)(1/P ) = u′(e)
e
z
η(z, e, u, s). (61)
Also, by the Keynes law,
m(1/P ) = e, (62)
which is a version of the equation of exchange (Fisher, 1911).
The pre-equilibrium price function η can be found by considering the dynamics of
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end-of-period net worth of a representative consumer,25
Wt +Gt = Mt(1−Qt) +QtWt+1. (63)
Using (58) to expand the discount factor Qt in front of Wt+1, and multiplying by
(1/P )t,
Wt(1/P )t = Mt(1/P )t(1−Qt)−Gt(1/P )t + βEt
[
νt+1
νt
(1/P )t
(1/P )t+1
Wt+1(1/P )t+1
]
,
(64)
where νt denotes the partial derivative (61), evaluated at state variables realized
at t. Also, it is true by (16) that
Wt(1/P )t = Wt
et
Zt
η(Zt, et, ut, st) = etη(Zt, et, ut, st).
Substituting this in (64), and applying (61), and (62), allows to interpret (64) as
a necessary condition for the price function η in a pre-equilibrium characterized
by η > 0. Restating this condition in the functional form (for generic values of
z, e, s) gives
η(z, e, u, s) = 1−Q(s)−g(s)
η(z, e, u, s)
τ(s)
+β
∫
S
u′(e′)e′
u′(e)e
η(z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′), (65)
where the laws of motion for z′ and e′ are given by (46), and (47), respectively.
25This can be derived as follows:
Wt +Gt = Ht ≡ Mt +BtQt + (Ht −Mt −BtQt)
= Mt +BtQt + (Ht −Mt −BtQt)− (Ht −Mt −BtQt)(1−Qt)
= Mt(1−Qt) +Qt[Mt +Bt + (Ht −Mt −BtQt)]
= Mt(1−Qt) +Qt[Yt +Bt + (Ht −Mt −BtQt)]
= Mt(1−Qt) +QtWt+1.
The second line subtracts a term that is zero in equilibrium, by the optimality
condition (59). The fourth line uses the Keynes law Mt = Yt, and the last line
applies (12), the definition of Wt+1.
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Condition (65) can be compared with the definition of function τ(s), re-stated for
convenience,
τ(s) = 1− q(s)− g(s) + β
∫
S
u′(e′)e′
u′(e)e
τ(s′)dF (s, s′). (66)
Subtracting (66) from (65), one can define a new function x(z, e, u, s) ≡
η(z, e, u, s)− τ(s), which must be bounded, and jointly continuous. Proceeding in
this way, using Q(s) = q(s), and solving for x(s) yields
x(z, e, u, s) =
τ(s)
τ(s) + g(s)
β
∫
S
u′(e′)e′
u′(e)e
x(z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′). (67)
Define operator Y such that (67) is equivalent to Yx = x. This operator maps
the space of bounded, jointly continuous functions in variables z, e, u, s onto itself.
Under assumptions 4 and 5 on monetary policy, it is true that g(s) ≥ 0 and
τ(s) > 0 (as shown in subsection 2.6), so the ratio in front of β is in (0, 1]. Under
the assumed CRRA utility, and assumption 3, this is enough to establish that Y
is a contraction mapping, and hence there is exactly one solution to (67). Since
x(z, e, u, s) = 0 is a solution, it must be the only solution. Hence, the unique price
function consistent with pre-equilibrium with η > 0 is
η(z, e, u, s) = τ(s), for all z, e, u, s. (68)
To complete the construction of the pre-equilibrium with η > 0, one must compute
the law of motion for the aggregate state variable Zt. Consider (62), written as
Mt(1/P )t = et. Using (26), and (68), this is equivalent to
Ht
Mt
= h(st), (69)
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where h(s) ≡ τ(s) + g(s), as defined in subsection 2.6. Write the necessary condi-
tion (59) in the form
Bt(1−Qt) =
1−Qt
Qt
(Ht −Mt),
and substitute into the law of motion (15). Using (69), and the definition of
τ(s), one finds that the unique model of the form (29) consistent with the actual
evolution of Zt is
z′
z
=
1
q(s)
β
∫
S
u′(e′)e′
u′(e)e
τ(s′)
τ(s)
dF (s, s′) ≡ θ̃(s), (70)
and one can identify θ(z, e, u, s) = zθ̃(s). Under the assumed monetary policy, the
growth rate in Zt does not depend on state variables other than st.
With the unique set of functions η,Q, θ consistent with pre-equilibrium with η > 0,
proposition 4 guarantees that there is exactly one corresponding value function v.
Hence, the constructed pre-equilibrium is unique.
4.3 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The previous subsections show that under assumptions 4 and 5 there exists a
unique pre-equilibrium in which the value of money remains strictly positive. Ac-
cording to condition (iii) of definition 2, any equilibrium price function η must
then be strictly positive. Since every equilibrium is a pre-equilibrium, there can
be at most one equilibrium with η > 0. Since the pre-equilibrium of the previous
section satisfies condition (iii), it is an equilibrium, and hence there exists only
one equilibrium with strictly positive value of money.
One must also conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium with valued money
for every specification of monetary policy consistent with assumptions 4 and 5,
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in which case the fundamental value of money is completely characterized by
condition (68). Intuitively, the role of a reasonable monetary policy is to provide
consumers with the knowledge that a monetary equilibrium exists, in which case
money is endogenously accepted in exchange by individual decisions of rational
competitive users.
5 Discussion
5.1 Equilibrium Selection Mechanism
Condition (iii) of definition 2 is technically an equilibrium selection mechanism,
extending the list of two requirements in Lucas (1978, p. 1432). However, it rests
on the principle of individual rationality, and hence is very well motivated.
Since conditions (i)-(ii) are satisfied in the pre-equilibrium with valued money of
section 4, rational and fully informed consumers must see no reason to reject this
outcome a priori, before the market for goods opens. If monetary policy is designed
to satisfy assumptions 4 and 5, it must be common knowledge that there exists a
(unique) pre-equilibrium with a positive value of money, at every given realization
of state variables. Then, only if investors are willing to agree that the value of
money is indeed zero upon observing this outcome, the alternative equilibrium
could materialize in which money would be worthless. But this extreme form of
learning from the price would arguably contradict individual rationality, since it
costs nothing (on the margin) to disagree with the market value of zero, especially
under the common knowledge that the pre-equilibrium with valued money could
materialize. Hence, a strict preference for acquiring more money at the margin
can safely be assumed as credible off-equilibrium strategy.
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5.1.1 Behavioral Aspect of Condition (iii)
This section shows that the non-zero market value of money is supported in a
pre-equilibrium precisely when a representative consumer individually decides to
assign strictly positive marginal valuation to her beginning-of-period net worth.
Hence, the generalized definition of equilibrium can be interpreted as imposing
this decision automatically, conditional on a reasonable monetary policy.
By equation (51), a pre-equilibrium value function v(h, z, e, u, s) must be strictly
increasing in h, at the level of beginning-of-period net worth h = [1 + χ(s)]z, for
each z, e, u, s, whenever η > 0. To prove the converse, let η,Q, θ, v be functions
specified as in (a)-(b) of definition 2, and satisfying conditions (i)-(ii). Consider a
behavioral postulate that the value function used by a representative consumer is
strictly increasing in h, i.e., that consumers strictly prefer to hold more net worth,
rather than less, at the opening of the market.
Hypothesis 1 The value function v(h, z, e, u, s), used by a representative con-
sumer, is strictly increasing in h, at h = [1 + χ(s)]z, for all z, e, u, s.
Proposition 10 Under Hypothesis 1, η(z, e, u, s) > 0, for all z, e, u, s, in a pre-
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose η(z, e, u, s) = 0 for some z, e, u, s. Then, a consumer with value
function v that is strictly increasing in h finds it optimal to set y = ȳ(z, e, u, s) > 0
and m = 0 to maximize the right-hand side of (42). This true in particular at
h = [1 + χ(s)]z, which results in a violation of condition (ii) of definition 2, so it
is necessary that η(z, e, u, s) > 0, for all z, e, u, s.
Hence, the assumption that money is valuable in a pre-equilibrium is equivalent to
the behavioral postulate of Hypothesis 1, so condition (iii) of definition 2 could be
alternatively formulated as: (iii) For each z, e, u, s, if there are functions ηp, Qp, θp
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specified as in (a), for which a function vp specified as in (b) satisfies (i)-(ii),
and if ηp(z, e, u, s) > 0, then v(h, z, e, u, s) is strictly increasing in h, at h =
[1+χ(s)]z. This would highlight the behavioral aspect of the equilibrium selection
mechanism, and the strict positivity of equilibrium value of money would follow
from proposition 10.
5.2 Ruling Out Speculative Price Dynamics
Economic intuition behind condition (67) can be developed as follows. Comparing
the equilibrium value of money implied by (68) with equation (62), one obtains
τ(st) = Zt/Mt. Using this in (18) gives g(st) = Gt/Mt, and then h(st) ≡ τ(st) +
g(st) = Ht/Mt. Hence, the function h(s) reflects the inverse marginal propensity
to consume out of Ht, and the function x(z, e, s) can be identified with deviation
of Ht/Mt from h(st),
x(Zt, et, st) =
(
Zt
Mt
+
Gt
Mt
)
−
(
τ(st) +
Gt
Mt
)
=
Ht
Mt
− h(st).
The content of condition (67) is that this difference is dynamically unstable. At a
given Ht, if a representative consumer decides to choose Mt according to a time-
invariant rule with Ht/Mt ≥ h(st), and Ht/Mt > h(st) with positive probability,
then the ratio Ht/Mt must eventually exceed any positive bound. By Mt(1/P )t =
et, the real value of Ht must then exceed any bound relative to et, violating
individual rationality. Similarly, if a representative consumer decides to choose
Mt according to a time-invariant rule with Ht/Mt ≤ h(st), and Ht/Mt < h(st)
with a positive probability, then the aggregate ratio Ht/Mt must eventually turn
negative, since x(Zt, et, st) must exceed any negative bound. But this cannot
happen without violating the non-negativity of Ht, imposed by the supplier of
money on nominal net worth.
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By assumption 5, equilibrium must be characterized by low interest rates in order
to induce consumers to sell all endowment in the market for goods, such that
Yt(1/P )t = et. By the Keynes law, this is equivalent to Mt(1/P )t = et, which can
be written as
(1/P )t =
et
Ht
Ht
Mt
.
At the same time, the fundamental value of money can be defined as
(1/P )∗t ≡
et
Zt
τ(st) =
et
Ht
h(st).
Subtracting this from the previous condition,
(1/P )t − (1/P )
∗
t =
et
Ht
(
Ht
Mt
− h(st)
)
,
so the market value of money differs from the fundamental value precisely when
the aggregate ’inverse marginal propensity to consume’ Ht/Mt differs from h(st).
Since this is never optimal, as discussed below equation (68), equilibrium value of
money never deviates from (1/P )∗t .
5.3 Relation to Existing Literature
The contribution of this paper is to argue that the concept of equilibrium of Lucas
(1972, 1978) can be successfully applied to a monetary economy with explicit
existence of frictions, and realistically specified monetary policy, without imposing
the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint.26
The conclusion that the value of money is uniquely determined should not be taken
as justification for selecting the unique bounded solution for inflation in standard
26Hence, the paper follows a different path than the subsequent work of R. Lucas
(see Sargent, 2015).
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new-Keynesian models (Woodford, 2003; Gaĺı, 2015).27 In these models, nominal
net worth is undefined, while in the present paper it plays the key role of nominal
scale variable, allowing the supplier of money to engineer essentially any path of
inflation with no regard to the Taylor principle. This can be accomplished by the
second dimension of monetary policy, corresponding to a continuous helicopter
drop of new net worth.28
This work complements the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), in which the
supplier of money (often simply called government) issues fiat money and interest-
bearing debt as liabilities (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994;
Woodford, 1995). The FTPL interprets qt, gt as determinants of government sur-
pluses, interpreted as seigniorage and taxes, respectively. Given a pre-determined
measure of nominal liabilities, the price level is defined as the unique conversion
factor that makes their real value equal to the present value of the surpluses. The
assumption that the government is actually able to issue valuable nominal liabili-
ties, and commit to a given path or real surpluses, is known as non-Ricardian fiscal
policy (Woodford, 1995), and has been subject to much controversy (Kocherlakota
and Phelan, 1999; Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2000; Buiter, 2002; Niepelt, 2004).
The present study provides the implementation theory missing in the bare for-
mulation of the FTPL, confirming that the supplier of money can indeed follow
a non-Ricardian policy. This, however, raises the question of the validity of the
usual interpretation of the FTPL, since the supplier of money is by construction
a generic monetary authority, while fiscal government is not even present in the
27The usual argument for this relies on the so-called Taylor principle (Taylor,
1993; Clarida et al., 2000), according to which the monetary authority must com-
mit to raising interest rate sufficiently strongly in response to inflation. This has
been forcefully criticized by Cochrane (2011, 2018) as lacking economic justifica-
tion, and empirical support.
28The idea of helicopter drop of money, originally due to Friedman (1969), has
recently been under renewed interest (Bernanke, 2002, 2003; Buiter, 2014; Benigno
and Nisticò, 2020; Gaĺı, 2020).
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model. Related, the interpretation assigned to qt, gt by the FTPL reverses their
economic meaning. The nominal interest rate implied by the discount factor qt is
best seen as tax on the receipts from the market for goods, while gt is the flow of
seigniorage, defined as real revenue of those agents who receive the transfers first.
On the surface, the paper supports the practice of imposing the CIA constraint,
interpreted as equilibrium condition in the market for goods. This is only valid
under a reasonable design of monetary policy, so imposing the CIA constraint can
seriously misrepresent individual incentives to use money. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the present model offers a way to clearly distinguish money from other
securities, which is missing in models relying on an ad-hoc specifications.
Much of modern thinking about money is rooted in the so-called portfolio tradition
(Hicks, 1935; Keynes, 1930; Tobin, 1958; Friedman, 1956). It is interesting to note
that equilibrium selection mechanism proposed here would not be operational
under that interpretation, which abstracts from the market for goods, and treats
money as purely speculative asset. In contrast, consumers in the present model
optimally plan to spend money as soon as possible, also when the nominal rate
of interest is zero, which appears consistent with empirical evidence, and the
anecdotal fact that rational consumers treat money as hot potato, rather than
investment asset.29
By successfully integrating a theory of money based on reduced-form frictions
with asset pricing, this paper finds middle ground between imposing the CIA con-
straint, and starting from more specific assumptions about the environment, with
prominent examples of OLG models (Samuelson, 1958; Grandmont and Laroque,
1973; Wallace, 1980), turnpike models (Townsend, 1980), models of self-insurance
29By highlighting these differences, the paper contributes to the literature reject-
ing the portfolio interpretation for lacking both internal consistency, and economic
intuition (for a survey, see Kohn, 1988).
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against idiosyncratic risks (Bewley, 1977; Aiyagari, 1994), or models in which the
technology of exchange is restricted to infrequent bilateral meetings (Kiyotaki and
Wright, 1989; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Shi, 1995; Lagos and Wright, 2005). Many
of these theories rely on specific assumptions which are often overly restrictive,
and not always necessary (or even sufficient) to address the question at hand.
While some admit enough tractability, others do not. For example, the approach
based on bilateral meetings is plagued with analytical difficulties arising from the
need to keep track of random changes in the distribution of money across agents,
which can only be resolved by imposing additional stylized assumptions (Howitt,
2003). Moreover, following the contribution of Kocherlakota (1998), it is now clear
that all explicit monetary environments must share the properties that (1) there
exists a fundamental motive for bilateral exchange, and (2) there is no publicly
available record (memory) of individual actions, which in particular implies that
private promises are not credible. The present paper imposes these properties
more directly, which can still be seen as minimalist’s way of looking frictions in
the face (Hicks, 1935).
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